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Priming has recently emerged in the literature as offering advantages in the preparation for skilled perfor-
mance. Accordingly, the current study tested the efficacy of imagery against a priming paradigm as a means of 
enhancing motor performance: in essence, contrasting a preparation technique primarily under the conscious 
control of the performer to an unconscious technique promoting automaticity. The imagery intervention was 
guided by the PETTLEP model, while the priming intervention took the form of a scrambled sentence task. 
Eighteen skilled field-hockey players performed a dribbling task under imagery, priming, skill-focus, and 
control conditions. Results revealed a significant improvement in speed and technical accuracy for the imagery 
condition as opposed to the skill-focus, control, and priming conditions. In addition, there were no significant 
differences in performance times or technical accuracy between the priming and control conditions. The study 
provides further support for the efficacy of imagery to elicit enhanced motor skill performance but questions 
the emerging emphasis on priming as an effective tool in preparation for physical tasks.
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Cognitive psychology has seen a resurgence of inter-
est around the concept of consciousness (Velmans, 2000), 
which has subsequently transferred into the sport psychol-
ogy literature. The emergence of cognitive science led 
to the idea of a cognitive unconscious (Reber, 1993) in 
the form of complex information processing that is con-
ducted without conscious awareness. One such premise 
is automaticity, which is associated with the execution of 
skilled movement and is considered to be fast, effortless, 
and without the need for technical attention (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999). This is opposed to the defining features 
of conscious processing, which are mental acts of which 
individuals are aware that are intentioned, require effort, 
and are also controllable (Logan & Cowan, 1984).
Automatic mental processes free one’s limited 
conscious attentional capacity (Kahneman, 1973), allow 
rapid processing, and are manifested in the behavior of 
skilled performers as appearing not to have to think about 
what they are doing (Singer, Lidor, & Cauraugh, 1993). 
Within the realm of performance sport, appropriate self-
direction of thought processes before and during task 
execution has been shown to make a significant difference 
in the level of performance attained (Abernethy, Maxwell, 
Jackson, & Masters, 2007; Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, 
& Carr, 2004; Moran, 2009; Singer, 2000; Singer et al., 
1993). Reflecting these stances, a debate is emerging 
about the comparative efficacy of strategies to develop 
conscious thoughts that are conducive for physical per-
formance, as contrasted to the promotion of unconscious 
processing through automaticity approaches.
Traditionally, the approach from the sport psychol-
ogy literature has advocated the provision of mental 
skills training (MST; e.g., Frey, Laguna, & Ravizza, 
2003; Wrisberg, Simpson, Loberg, Withycombe, & 
Reed, 2009) focused on the immediate preparation for 
performance. Implementing this approach to psycho-
logical preparation requires the allocation of appropriate 
cognitive-behavioral techniques to allow the performer to 
transform maladaptive cognitions to those that are readily 
adaptable (Burton & Raedeke, 2008). Thereby, the focus 
being on promoting techniques, for example imagery, 
that can aid the right thoughts tailored to preparation and 
optimal performance (Weinberg, 2008). Imagery can be 
considered as primarily under the conscious control of 
the imager (Holmes & Calmels, 2008) and the extensive 
imagery literature base has always supported the inclu-
sion of some form of imagery process in sport’s practice 
and pre-performance regimes (Connaughton, Wadey, 
Hanton, & Jones, 2008; MacNamara, Button, & Collins, 
2010; Smith & Wright, 2008).
Contrasting Pre-Performance Preparation 
Strategies: Theoretical Perspectives
As a comparatively opposing development, there has been 
an increasing emphasis in the literature on unconscious 
processing through the promotion of automaticity (Kin-
rade, Jackson, & Ashford, 2010; Lam, Maxwell, & Mas-
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ters, 2010; Liao & Masters, 2001). This notion has been 
promoted in the literature through techniques imported 
from cognitive psychology, for example, priming. The 
social cognition literature has demonstrated priming 
effects on cognitive and motor performance (Bargh, 
Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bry, Follenfant, & Meyer, 2008; 
Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998; Kay, Wheeler, 
Bargh, & Ross, 2004; Schubert & Häfner, 2003). Prim-
ing refers to “the influence a stimulus has on subsequent 
performance of the processing system” (Baddeley, 1997, 
p. 352). It has been suggested that primes developed to 
manipulate focus toward global aspects of performance 
would be advantageous, as they would encourage auto-
maticity (Bargh et al., 1996; Bruce, Carson, Burton, & 
Ellis, 2000; Hull, Slone, Meteyer, & Matthews, 2002).
To prime an individual’s performance, a commonly 
used method from cognitive psychology is for participants 
to be presented with a series of five-word items in which 
they are required to use four of the words to form a gram-
matically correct sentence (Bargh et al., 1996; Kay & 
Ross, 2003; Srull & Wyer, 1979). The scrambled sentence 
paradigm has been used to determine how a cognitive 
representation primed in one situation affects behavior 
in a seemingly unrelated situation (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000). Recent and innovative applications to physical 
performance (Ashford & Jackson, 2010; Banting, Dim-
mock, & Grove, 2011; Bry, Meyer, Oberlé, & Gherson, 
2009) have employed this scrambled sentences method 
before completion of a hockey-dribbling task, cycling 
task, and a relay race respectively.
Offering further support for the promotion of auto-
maticity, explicit monitoring or skill-focus theories sug-
gest that pressure increases self-consciousness concern-
ing performing correctly, which in turn leads performers 
to focus their attention on skill execution to ensure 
an optimal outcome (Beilock & Carr, 2001). Explicit 
attention to step-by-step processes is thought to disrupt 
the execution of proceduralized processes that normally 
run outside of conscious awareness (Baumeister, 1984; 
Beilock et al., 2004; Beilock & Carr, 2001). The studies 
by Beilock and her colleagues contain results consistent 
with current theories of practice-based automaticity in 
that extended practice leads to proceduralized control that 
does not require constant attention (Beilock, Wierenga, 
& Carr, 2002).
Interestingly, and in contrast to these theoretical 
assumptions, Ericsson and colleagues have asserted that 
automaticity theories are limited for explanations of the 
mediation of skilled performance (Ericsson, 2002; Erics-
son & Kintsch, 1995; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 
1993). They propose that experts maintain high levels 
of conscious monitoring and control that are essential 
for further improvements in performance. A recent 
example in sport (McRobert, Ward, Eccles, & Williams, 
2011) showed that the number of thoughts (the majority 
of which were task related) reported by skilled versus 
less-skilled athletes during performance was higher. The 
finding that experts’ incidental memory for task-relevant 
information was superior to that of novices also implies 
that forms of expert performance remain mediated by 
attention-demanding cognitive processes (Ericsson & 
Lehmann, 1996). These theoretical propositions represent 
the two sides of the debate identified earlier: specifically, 
whether the direction of thoughts should be task related 
to performance, or promoting automaticity through 
unconscious processing.
Addressing the Debate: Effectively 
Contrasting Between the Two Approaches
In an application of the priming approach to physical 
performance, Ashford and Jackson (2010) employed 
the scrambled sentences method before completion of a 
hockey-dribbling task. The priming intervention gener-
ated superior performance on the hockey-dribbling task, 
with respect to both outcome (time) and process (techni-
cal accuracy) parameters.
However, there were two problems with the other-
wise carefully conducted study by Ashford and Jackson 
(2010). Firstly, the pre-performance priming condition 
was contrasted with an in-performance, explicit focus 
condition—a technique seemingly designed to obstruct 
performance by promoting thinking about the task 
through explicit instructions (Baumeister, 1984). The 
difficulty of a task within the constraints of the experi-
mental protocol, operationally delineate its nominal level 
of difficulty (Guadagnoli & Lee, 2004). This skill-focus 
condition involved a secondary task and thereby posed 
an additional cognitive challenge. Cognitive load theory 
(Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003) stresses that mental load, 
which originates from the interaction between task char-
acteristics (e.g., task format, task complexity) and learner 
characteristics (e.g., experience, prior knowledge), yields 
an a priori estimate, which refers to the cognitive capacity 
that is actually allocated to accommodate the demands 
imposed by the task (van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005). 
Therefore a difference in both task difficulty and cognitive 
load were apparent, which is not directly comparable to 
any of the other conditions employed within the Ashford 
and Jackson study.
Secondly, and attempting to address this erroneous 
pre-performance to in-performance contrast, the new 
priming approach was not compared with another, more 
well-established pre-performance strategy, namely, 
imagery. Not only would this represent a fairer compari-
son (between two pre-performance strategies), it would 
also enable an evaluation of the comparative efficacy of 
priming against another empirically supported prepara-
tion technique. Furthermore, such a comparison holds 
implications for applied practitioners and hence provides 
a valuable addition in a sport psychology journal.
Reflecting these parameters, the aim of the current 
study was to see if priming could also potentially enhance 
performance against imagery. Thereby, comparing the 
conscious technique of imagery (Holmes & Calmels, 
2008) through directing thoughts that are task related 
to performance, to the unconscious priming paradigm 
promoting automaticity (Bargh et al., 1996; Bruce et al., 
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2000) employed by Ashford and Jackson (2010). We 
hypothesized that imagery would be more effective than 
priming due to the following reasons: Firstly, the major-
ity of priming studies from the social cognition literature 
have used priming to activate mental or perceptual repre-
sentations leading to behavior corresponding with specific 
attributes (e.g., Bry et al., 2008; Dijksterhuis & Van Knip-
penberg, 1998; Hull et al., 2002). Secondly, apart from 
the Ashford and Jackson study, research in the sport and 
exercise psychology domain (Bry et al., 2009; Banting 
et al., 2011) have adopted priming for cooperation and 
motivational behaviors, rather than simple motoric effect, 
and notably use novice performers in both circumstances.
Thirdly, through providing evidence on explicit mon-
itoring, the authors have adopted Ericsson and colleagues’ 
proposition that these are limited for explanations of the 
mediation of skilled performance. If experts maintain 
high levels of conscious monitoring and control, we feel 
priming is unlikely to have an effect on expert perform-
ers. Furthermore, imagery is well established in the sport 
psychology literature as having performance-enhancing 
effects (e.g., Connaughton et al., 2008; MacNamara et al., 
2010; Smith & Wright, 2008). We therefore hypothesized 
that imagery would enhance performance relative to con-
trol, skill-focused, and priming conditions. In addition, 
we hypothesized that the “explicit focus” manipulation 
(Baumeister, 1984; Beilock et al., 2004; Beilock & Carr, 
2001) would have a detrimental effect when compared 
with the control condition.
Method
Participants
Following institutional ethical approval and informed 
consent, 18 field hockey players were recruited. The 
sample comprised 9 males (age: M = 31.78 years, SD = 
9.62 years) and 9 females (age: M = 27.44 years, SD = 
5.53 years). Collectively, participants reported having a 
mean of 16.5 years’ experience (SD = 7.49 years) ranging 
from county to international standard.
Task
Ashford and Jackson’s (2010) hockey-dribbling task was 
adopted for the study. Participants were required to use an 
Indian dribble to maneuver a field-hockey ball around a 
12-m slalom course, marked out by cones at 1-m intervals. 
All participants were instructed to use their own equip-
ment for familiarity purposes when completing trials in 
all of the attention conditions outlined here. To enable 
comparison with Ashford and Jackson’s original study, 
we employed the high-pressure condition they used as 
this was shown to yield the largest effect. Accordingly, 
each trial was recorded using a Sony DCR-HC51 digital 
video camera.
Performance Times. The time taken to complete each 
trial was recorded to the nearest 0.02 s directly from video 
footage using Quintic software.
Lateral Displacement. The mean maximal lateral 
displacement was calculated for each cone in each 
attention condition, through the use of a reference grid. 
This consisted of zones 5 cm wide measured adjacent to 
the cones, enabling the maximum displacement of the ball 
corresponding to each cone of the task to be recorded. 
An independent rater was used to randomly assess 10% 
of trials in each condition. No differences between raters 
were apparent.
Pressure Manipulation. The high-pressure manipu-
lation was replicated from Ashford and Jackson’s (2010) 
study through the presence of a video camera and a cover 
story. Participants were informed that footage from the 
hockey-dribbling task would be used in a film about the 
basic skills of field hockey that the researcher was to 
present to the national governing body. Reflecting the 
focused purposes of the present investigation, however, 
pressure was not considered as a factor and no contrasting 
low-pressure condition was included.
Attention Conditions
Priming. A scrambled sentence task (Srull & Wyer, 
1979) was adopted for the priming manipulation. Words 
associated with autonomous performance were selected 
for the content of the prime: for example, “controlled,” 
“fluent,” and “graceful.” Before completing trials, 
participants were given unlimited time to complete 
the grammatical task, comprising 30 five-word items 
presented in a random order: for example, “slalom 
balanced was the where.” Participants were instructed 
to use four of the five words presented to form a 
grammatically correct sentence, for example, “the slalom 
was balanced.”
Imagery. Each participant informed the researcher 
which slalom from their three control trials they had 
performed to the best of their ability. This individualized 
video footage was shown to each participant as a prime for 
mental rehearsal concerning the upcoming execution of the 
hockey-dribbling task. The footage lasted approximately 
7 s, dependent on individual skill differences. To ensure 
the actual movements and their imagined counterparts 
were proximally and functionally equivalent, the 
PETTLEP approach of Holmes and Collins (2001) was 
used to guide participants’ motor imagery. This evidence-
based, 7-point checklist of imagery delivery emphasizes 
the minimum requirement areas in which practitioners 
should monitor the equivalence to the physical task to 
enhance the efficacy of their practice. Participants were 
able to mentally practice their actual hockey-dribbling 
task, adopting a characteristic posture, wearing their 
typical hockey attire, all within the environment the 
task was taking place. Participants were thus provided 
with an external imagery guide that resonated with the 
represented movement pattern in real time.
Skill Focus. Participants were asked to “be aware of 
what you are doing,” and “focus on the movement of your 
hands throughout the trial” (Baumeister, 1984). When 
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each participant pronated or supinated their dominant 
hand, they verbalized the words “down” and “up,” in 
response to a tone that sounded on a 6-s variable-interval 
schedule.
Control. All attention conditions took place after the 
control condition, in which individuals were given the 
instructions to “complete the dribbling task as quickly 
and accurately as possible” (Ashford & Jackson, 2010).
Procedure
A standardized procedure was followed by all partici-
pants, and it consisted of a warm-up and five trials of the 
dribbling task for familiarization purposes, with the last 
three serving as the control condition. Participants were 
informed they would receive a specific set of instructions 
before the three-trial completion of each experimental 
condition. Following this, a Latin square design was 
adopted to allow attentional conditions to be assigned 
quasi randomly, permitting the researchers to control for 
variation in presentation order (Hinkelmann & Kemp-
thorne, 2008). Participant numbers were deliberately 
selected to enable order of presentation to be completely 
crossed. Participants were further informed that, if any 
significant errors occurred, for example, losing control 
of the ball beyond the reference grid, the trial would be 
repeated. This procedure ensured accuracy was main-
tained throughout the trials (cf. Ashford & Jackson, 2010; 
Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002).
After each testing stage, a modified version of the 
funneled debrief adopted in the Bargh et al. (1996) study 
was used, whereby participants were questioned on their 
experiences with the condition, their adherence to it, and 
how easy/useful they had found it. On completion of the 
whole experimental procedure, participants were fully 
debriefed about the nature and purpose of the study and 
thanked for their participation.
Data Analysis
Two one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs were con-
ducted on the attentional focus conditions. Mean trial 
completion time and mean lateral displacement served 
as the dependent variables. Post hoc analyses were used 
to identify the differences between the attentional focus 
conditions when significant effects were identified, with a 
Bonferroni adjustment being applied. Partial eta-squared 
(ηp2) were reported as the effect size (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007), with Cohen’s d used for all simple effect 
comparisons. Values of .02, .05, and .08 indicated small, 
medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Cohen, 
1992).
Results
Initial testing showed no significant effects due to the 
Latin square design on either variable (time: F(2, 34) 
= .342, p = .713; lateral displacement: F(2, 34) = .118, 
p = .889; cf. Myers, 1979). Furthermore, although par-
ticipants were varied (reflecting perhaps their status as 
county, national, or international performers), no outliers 
were apparent. Accordingly, data were collapsed across 
conditions for simpler analysis.
Performance Times
ANOVA revealed that the mean performance time was 
significantly different among the four attentional condi-
tions, F(3, 51) = 46.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .73. Post hoc 
analyses indicated that performance was significantly 
faster in the imagery condition, than in the priming (p < 
.001, d = .36), skill-focus (p < .001, d = .72), and control 
conditions (p < .001, d = .38). In addition, post hoc analy-
ses revealed that performance was significantly slower 
in the skill-focus condition than in both the control (p < 
.001, d = .39) and the priming conditions (p < .001, d = 
.38). Finally, there was no significant difference between 
performance times in the priming condition compared 
with the control condition (see Figure 1).
Interrater Reliability
To establish objectivity, two individuals assessed the 
lateral displacement of the hockey ball in a random 
selection of trials (10%) from each condition (Ashford 
Figure 1 — Mean (± SE) performance times and lateral 
displacement in the control, priming, imagery, and skill-focus 
conditions.
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& Jackson, 2010). Calculation of Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient indicated the scores of the judges were highly 
correlated, r = .81, p < .001 (Judge A: M = 25.89 cm, 
SD = 5.28 cm; Judge B: M = 26.08 cm, SD = 5.55 cm), 
a similar finding to Ashford and Jackson’s (2010) study 
(r = .83, p < .001).
Lateral Displacement
ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the 
mean lateral displacement measurements among the four 
attentional conditions, F(3, 51) = 14.98, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.47. Post hoc analyses indicated that lateral displacement 
was significantly lower in the imagery condition than in 
the control (p < .001, d = .39), skill-focus (p < .001, d 
= .56), and priming conditions (p < .001, d = .33). No 
significant differences were observed between the control 
and skill-focus conditions, between the control and prim-
ing conditions, or between the skill-focus and priming 
conditions (see Figure 1).
Participant Debrief
There was a general consensus from participants that 
imagery was facilitative to the motor task. The opposite 
was expressed for the skill-focus condition, which par-
ticipants found disruptive to performance. In terms of 
priming, some participants reported the task “calming” 
but adverse to how they optimally want to feel before 
performing the motor task. In other cases, participants 
reported the priming task as so “banal” that they failed 
to complete it properly, necessitating the recruitment and 
testing of five replacements.
Discussion
The primary aim of the current study was to examine 
the efficacy of imagery against priming as a means of 
enhancing motor performance—in essence, contrasting 
a technique, which is considered primarily under the 
conscious control of the performer (Holmes & Calmels, 
2008) with an unconscious technique promoting automa-
ticity (Bargh et al., 1996; Bruce et al., 2000; Hull et al., 
2002). Previous research from the sporting domain has 
supported the use of imagery as a performance-enhancing 
technique that can aid the direction of task-related 
thoughts tailored to preparation and optimal performance 
(Connaughton et al., 2008; MacNamara et al., 2010; 
Smith & Wright, 2008). Notably, the social cognition 
literature has supported priming effects on cognitive and 
motor performance (Bry et al., 2008; Dijksterhuis & Van 
Knippenberg, 1998; Kay et al., 2004; Schubert & Häfner, 
2003). In the sporting literature, however, priming has not 
yet been studied extensively.
Examination of performance times across the four 
attention conditions revealed performance to be signifi-
cantly faster in the imagery condition than in all the other 
three conditions. Ericsson and colleagues propose that 
experts maintain high levels of conscious monitoring 
and control, which are essential for further improvements 
in performance (Ericsson, 2002; Ericsson et al., 1993; 
Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). The skilled athlete’s primary 
desire with respect to his or her task is to continually 
enhance performance on that task. Consequently, she 
or he does not relinquish cognitive control of the task 
but, instead, retains and even enhances it in the form of 
the constant monitoring and evaluation of performance 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; McRobert et al., 2011). 
Supporting this theoretical proposition, imagery can be 
considered as primarily under the conscious control of 
the imager (Holmes & Calmels, 2008) and thus can be 
used as a strategy to mediate the direction of thoughts as 
task related to performance. Imagery is one of the most 
widely researched of all psychological interventions 
in sport and is very well established as a performance 
enhancement technique (e.g., Smith, Wright, Allsopp & 
Westhead, 2007; Wakefield & Smith, 2011; Weinberg, 
2008). This was further supported in the current study 
with hockey players performing significantly better fol-
lowing this technique.
The most noteworthy finding from Ashford and Jack-
son’s (2010) study was that performance was significantly 
faster in the priming condition than in the control condi-
tion, which they supported by the theoretical premise that 
the motor processing system resulted in an attentional 
focus and behavioral response that was consistent with 
the content of the prime (Bargh et al., 1996; Bruce et 
al., 2000; Hull et al., 2002). This is in stark contrast to 
the current study, where there was no significant differ-
ence in the performance times between the priming and 
control conditions. This is also apparent in the absence 
of significant difference in the technical accuracy of the 
task between these two conditions. Participants found 
priming to have no additional performance benefits 
than the control instruction of “complete the dribbling 
task as quickly and accurately as possible.” Notably, 
the majority of studies in the social cognition literature 
have used priming to activate a mental representation 
of a social group (e.g., older people, professors, dumb 
blondes) leading to behavior corresponding with specific 
attributes of the stereotype (Bry et al., 2008; Dijksterhuis 
& Van Knippenberg, 1998). These authors suggest that 
several behaviors may be evoked leading to improved 
performance; for example, participants may allocate their 
effort differently and hence the prime may automatically 
and subconsciously induce participants to concentrate on 
the task and to think harder about possible answers. In 
contrast, the purpose of priming in the current physical 
context was to avoid thinking about the task. However, in 
any priming task the assumption could be made that the 
translation of words to stimuli, and then to existing motor 
programs, involves working memory (Baddeley, 1997), 
which opposes the theoretical premise of the technique 
and may offer an explanation as to why priming elicited 
no difference to the control condition in this study.
As opposed to the imagery condition and as expected, 
significant performance decrements were evident in the 
skill-focused condition compared with the imagery, 
priming, and control conditions. Explicit monitoring or 
skill-focus theories suggest that pressure increases self-
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consciousness concerning performing correctly, which 
in turn leads performers to focus their attention on skill 
execution to ensure an optimal outcome (Beilock & Carr, 
2001). This study lends support to the contention that 
the skill-focused condition caused participants to focus 
their attention internally toward aspects of performance 
(e.g., Baumeister, 1984). In particular, the results high-
light the negative impact of attending to proceduralized 
components of a skill and allocation of attention playing 
a mediating role in performance degradation (cf. Guad-
agnoli & Lee, 2004) and additional cognitive load (Paas 
et al., 2003; van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005).
The purpose of analyzing the displacement of the 
hockey ball was to examine whether variations in per-
formance could be attributed to a general decrease in the 
speed of motor performance and/or a decrease in technical 
accuracy. Previous studies also utilizing a dribbling task 
with their participants (e.g., Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002; 
Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006) only used time as 
the performance measure and hence obtained no evalua-
tion of accuracy. In relation to this, Gray (2004) conducted 
a study assessing the impact of attentional allocation on 
hitting kinematics in baseball batters. Specifically, he 
observed that under the control and external focus con-
ditions, swing execution remained unaffected; however, 
the skill-focus condition caused a significant degrada-
tion of performance. Interestingly, in the current study 
lateral displacement for the skill-focus condition was not 
significantly higher than the control or priming attention 
conditions. Ashford and Jackson (2010) observed no sig-
nificant difference between their control and skill-focused 
lateral displacement, which our current study supports. 
Hence, although both studies demonstrated faster times 
in the control over the skill-focus condition, the accuracy/
error was not significantly detrimental to performance. 
In fact, the skill-focus condition caused the hockey play-
ers to perform the task slower but without significantly 
less accuracy on the task, a finding which does not fully 
support Gray’s (2004) study. The significant differences 
for lateral displacement in this study occurred between 
imagery and each of the other three attention conditions. 
Imagery displayed the least ball displacement over the 
slalom course and subsequently the highest technical 
accuracy for the motor performance (see Figure 1), pro-
viding further support for the technique.
Further Considerations on Priming
The main moderator of priming effects is applicability 
(Bry et al., 2009; DeCoster & Claypool, 2004), defined 
as the congruence between the features of a prime and 
the features of the behavior to be performed. The more 
congruent they are, the more likely the concept will 
be activated to perform the behavior (Higgins, 1996). 
Outside of the laboratory setting, sporting tasks vary 
considerably in the different behaviors and tasks that are 
necessary for successful performance. Clearly, the appli-
cability constraint would not hold when there are multiple 
subtasks to which the prime is differentially applicable. 
Hence, Higgins and Brendl’s (1995) applicability rule 
should be tested in sports that require highly complex 
technical aspects of performance (e.g., gymnastics) or 
different physical, technical, and tactical aspects (e.g., 
rugby). Furthermore, as priming is promoting automatic-
ity of movement, this unconscious processing is irrelevant 
for performers who need to think both before and during 
performance (e.g., boxing). Therefore, the range of sports 
and specific tasks that priming is applicable to warrants 
further investigation.
There are also further concerns with the practicality 
of priming for sports performers, if practitioners in the 
field are considering this technique as a preparation tool. 
The commonly used method, to prime an individual’s 
performance, is for participants to be presented with a 
series of five-word items in which they are required to 
use four of the words to form a grammatically correct 
sentence (Bargh et al., 1996; Kay & Ross, 2003; Srull & 
Wyer, 1979). The scrambled sentence paradigm has been 
used to determine how a cognitive representation primed 
in one situation affects behavior in a seemingly unrelated 
situation (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Expecting athletes 
to complete sentence-scrambling tasks before performing 
could be viewed as unrealistic. Alternative methods of 
presenting the primes (e.g., a video containing subliminal 
primes or flashcards) are therefore necessary (Bruce et 
al., 2000) if practitioners working in the real world are to 
adopt. This is further supported from the current study, 
in which five replacements had to be recruited, because 
participants reported the priming task as so “banal” that 
they failed to complete it properly.
Another issue relates to the nature of awareness 
with the prime. When participants’ complete priming 
tasks in research settings it is a novel activity (Ashford & 
Jackson, 2010; Bargh et al., 1996; Hull et al., 2002). The 
priming paradigms are proposed to be implicit in nature 
as participants are not aware of the prime or its intended 
effect. However, if practitioners in the sporting world 
were asking athletes to perform the priming technique on 
a regular basis as part of their psychological preparation, 
this premise would certainly be compromised. Moreover, 
from an applied standpoint there are important practical 
considerations to be resolved if priming only works if the 
performer is unaware as to the purpose of the technique. 
This is certainly implied by the “mere exposure” construct 
(Zajonc, 1980), where explicit as opposed to implicit 
priming reduces the effect (Bornstein, 1989). Furthermore, 
applied practitioners are guided by code of conducts pub-
lished by their governing bodies, such as the American 
Psychological Association (APA), British Psychological 
Society (BPS), and British Association of Sport and Exer-
cise Sciences (BASES). An interesting ethical question is 
posed if applied practitioners use a technique with their 
performers on a regular basis, the purpose of which they 
cannot disclose (Biddle, Bull, & Seheult, 1992; Petitpas, 
Brewer, Rivera, & Van Raalte, 1994).
As evidence-based practitioners seek to understand 
the most effective allocation of thought processes for the 
sport performers they are working with, they require spe-
cific empirical literature to guide and inform professional 
practice. While the results of the current study illustrate 
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the efficacy of imagery in motor performance, the drib-
bling skill was taken out of the sporting context. However, 
it was necessary for the current study to replicate the 
experimental protocol adopted by Ashford and Jackson 
(2010) if priming was to be fairly evaluated. Laboratory-
based investigations are useful because they enable the 
rigorous control of variables. However if empirical 
research is to be translated successfully into the applied 
world, the techniques of interest need to be ecologically 
valid (Bennett, 2000). Opportunely, support for imagery 
has already been established from ecologically valid set-
tings (e.g., Calmels, Holmes, Berthoumieux, & Singer, 
2004; Evans, Jones, & Mullen, 2004), testing its robust-
ness in true situations of heightened pressure. Hence the 
field is already in a position to provide practitioners and 
athletes with beneficial information regarding the facili-
tating effects of imagery (e.g., Holmes & Collins, 2001; 
Smith et al., 2007; Weinberg, 2008).
In conclusion, the current study provides further sup-
port for the efficacy of imagery to elicit enhanced motor 
performance. Results revealed that the imagery condition 
was effective in enhancing performance, based on both 
time and accuracy measurements, when compared with 
a control, priming, and self-focus attentional conditions. 
Owing to higher cognitive processes often being essential 
within the realm of performance sport, the present find-
ings reinforce the proposition that attentional allocation 
also has a significant impact on performance in this 
more complex arena. Consequently, we would advocate 
that sport psychology practitioners promote strategies to 
develop athlete’s conscious thoughts that are conducive 
for performance. In light of the present findings, the 
PETTLEP model should be considered to be a critical 
component of effective preparation for physical and 
mental performance. If this area of empirical research is 
to be translated successfully then the imagery developed 
for sport performers needs to be functionally effective 
in facilitating execution of the performance, especially 
under pressure.
Finally, from a philosophical standpoint, we would 
have to question the examination of techniques in an 
applied field (sport psychology) that have doubtful 
application. Of course, research must take place on a 
fundamental-to-applied continuum. In such cases, how-
ever, it seems disingenuous to not initially check the 
field for more appropriate (and perhaps more effective) 
points of comparison. We would clearly encourage further 
research into priming but perhaps with a better and more 
face-valid contrast.
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